In the two decades since the emergence of the European Union at Maastricht there has been a concerted attempt to build a European political space, typified by the debates on constitutionalisation and democratisation. Much less noticed, but no less important, has been the mobilisation of publics, interest groups and political parties against the integration process. In the light of the failure to realise the Laeken objectives, the stabilisation of an anti-integration bloc in the European Parliament, recurrent 'no' votes in national referenda and the emergence of an increasingly coordinated movement of critical interest groups, we argue that this opposition has become embedded and persistent, at both European and national levels. This will have considerable consequences for the Union itself and the way it has chosen to largely ignore sceptical voices to date.
Introduction
Over the last two decades the EU has attempted to build a European political space as exemplified by the debates on constitutionalisation and democratisation. In recent years, in particular since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the European integration process has been increasingly beset by obstacles, partly as the Union has been forced to face up to significant opposition to closer integration: the recent, piecemeal approach to reforming economic governance with the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact typify the overall lack of strategic vision. This opposition -most commonly labelled Euroscepticism -has been exemplified by the EU's failure to realise the Laeken objectives of bringing the Union closer to the people and of definitively allocating competences between European and national levels, the stabilisation of an anti-integration block in the European Parliament, recurrent 'no' votes in national referenda and the emergence of an increasingly coordinated movement of critical interest groups.
Opposition to the EU has become increasingly embedded both at European and national levels and highlights the urgent need for the EU to engage constructively with dissenting voices and to consider alternative views about paths towards further European integration. This situation has become more critical as a result of the global economic and financial crisis and the continuing Eurozone crisis, as well as prospective enlargements towards the Western Balkans, Iceland and potentially Turkey. These developments have not only helped to further undermine citizen support for the EU but have also led to significant policy implications for both the EU and the member states within the Union. Challenges to free movement and the single market in France, Denmark and the Netherlands, the ever more pointed intrusion into member states' fiscal and budgetary policy and the seeming inability of European Council meetings to produce comprehensive solutions to the Eurozone crisis, have all propelled the EU into an unprecedented phase of uncertainty, contributing to deeper and more embedded Euroscepticism with the potential to cause irreparable damage to the EU's quest for legitimacy and stability.
Opposition to the EU has often historically been portrayed as a passing phenomenon, the inevitable 'grit in the system' that occurs when political systems are built and develop. A case in point was one of the earliest significant works on Euroscepticism, by Benoit (1997) , which portrayed the situation in France as essentially temporary and conditioned solely by endogenous circumstance within the country. Even the dominant theoretical model in Eurosceptic studies -that of Szczerbiak & Taggart's 'hard/soft' approach (2003) -does not acknowledge any a priori reason for the existance of Euroscepticism, except as a means of policy differentiation from centrist parties, an approach underlined by Sitter's (2001) work on government-opposition dynamics. While this is certainly not a universal understanding of Euroscepticism (see Flood, 2002) , it has coloured debate and has reflected elite understanding as well. We argue however that this is a misleading frame of reference and that it is necessary to engage with Euroscepticism in a fundamentally different manner.
This article argues that while the European Union has made a conscious decision to shift towards a more popular and inclusive form of integration since the Maastricht Treaty, this has been of questionable success to date. This shift is doubly ironic, given that the persistent (even growing) gap between elites and publics has long been identified and targetted through ever-increasing communication programmes from the European institutions and national governments (Bijsmans & Altides, 2007) . The failure of these programmes has usually been understood as a failure to communicate the Union's values, since the literature points towards increasing knowledge being associated with increasing support (e.g. Gabel, 1998 ), but it is also grounded in the emergence of a block of active opposition within both public opinion and political action, a block that has been prepared to spend its political capital in raising its concerns and fears. When confronted with an elite establishment that has been unwilling to do the same -for reasons of low interest across the public as a whole -this has resulted in the embedding of opposition, effectively giving it a structural role in the integration process.
2 To explore these ideas further, the article starts by discussing how opposition has emerged, particularly since the early 1990s. It then offers an overview of the spread of opposition across the EU's political system, at both national and European levels, before offering some thoughts on the implications of this for the EU's development and the future study of Euroscepticism.
The Emergence of Opposition
While there was some disagreement within the six states who formed the original European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (for example French communists) in practice the elite consensus of the era, which concentrated on the benefits of economic integration and the need to bind previously hostile states together, bound the six together. This prevailing mood was largely accepted by the general public in these 2 We used the term 'embedded' here in the sense of Ruggie (1982) Flood, 2002) . There is no doubt that Maastricht marks a step-change in public awareness due to the nature of the proposals (see Flood, 2002; Startin, 2005; Mudde, 2011; Verney, 2011; Vasilopoulou, this volume) and is significant for a number of reasons. 
The Persistence of Opposition
In this paper we argue that opposition to the EU has become increasingly embedded post-Maastricht both at European and national levels across a range of contexts and environments, no more so than in the dayto-day existence of political parties within the Union's member states. It is in this area of academic enquiry that the majority of studies have focused. There have been numerous works on Euroscepticism and comparative political parties (see Taggart, 1998; Ray, 1999; Hooghe et. al., 2002; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003 Marks et. Al,. 2006; Vasilopoulou, 2011) as well as individual party case studies targeting countries within and beyond the EU (see Raunio, 1999; Conti, 2003; Startin, 2005; Skinner, 2010; Stojic, 2011) . Many studies have adopted this narrow focus on political parties (and to a lesser extent public opinion), even though it is apparent that since Maastricht
Euroscepticism is now embedded at various other levels such as non-party groups, within governments and within the media. At the same time referenda and European Parliament elections have re-enforced this sense of embededness as Euroscepticism has taken on new levels of salience. We have now entered an era where Euroscepticism has become an increasingly transnational and pan-European, phenomenon.
These developments have been somewhat neglected by the academic community which has over-focused on divisions in the literature based largely around the role of political parties. Mudde's (2011) recent, worthy discussion of the divisions in the literature between the so-called Sussex (primarily country-based cases highlighting strategic concerns) and North Carolina schools (primarily cross-national studies, focusing on ideology) is a case in point, with its main focus on party classifications. While the role of political parties and their relationship with Europe's citizens are central to our understanding of Euroscepticism and its overall reach within states' political systems, we argue that a more holistic, nuanced and inter-disciplinary approach is required in order to obtain a full understanding of the way it has become increasingly embedded across the Union, as typified by the content of this special edition with contributions not uniquely focusing on parties (e.g. FitzGibbon; Startin & Krouwel; Guerra;
Serricchio et al this volume). In the next section of the article we therefore look not only at political parties and public opinion, but focus as well on the embedded nature of Euroscepticism within governments, within the anti EU block in the European Parliament, within non-party groups as well as the crucial role played by referenda and European elections.
Political parties
Building on Taggart (1998) and Szczerbiak & Taggart's (2003; seminal works in the area of Euroscepticism and political parties it is clear that 'hard' and 'soft' Eurosceptic parties exist in almost every member state and that -contrary to Taggart's (1998) original analysis -some increasingly exist in government. Broadly speaking it is possible to identify four different classifications of Eurosceptic parties: Firstly, single-issue pro-sovereignty parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Danish Folkebevaegelsen (People's Movement) that are opposed to European integration per se. These are parties that adopt a 'hard Eurosceptic' discourse, which have made no significant electoral impact beyond the context of European elections but which are embedded within the domestic party systems within the context of elections for the European Parliament (see Usherwood, 2010) . The second type of Eurosceptic party identifiable within this overview are Radical Right parties (RRPs) for whom opposition to the EU has become a central policy plank as they have sought to widen their domestic appeal beyond their traditional 'bread and butter' anti-immigrant discourse. The extent of opposition to the EU varies from party to party and country to country -contrast the British National Party's (BNP's) vehement opposition to the EU with the Flemish Vlaams Belang's more measured approach -but there is no doubt that opposing Europe has become an increasingly embedded part of RRPs and their overall policy packages (see Mudde, 2007 , Hainsworth, 2008 Keith, 2010) . Eurosceptic Green parties in Scandinavia and the UK can also legitimately be included in this category.
The fourth and final classification of Eurosceptic parties which are becoming increasingly embedded in European states' party systems are those mainstream parties who are increasingly adopting a 'soft Eurosceptic' discourse on issues like the EU budget, the future of the Euro and further enlargement.
These are usually (but not exclusively) mainstream right parties who appear to respond to volatile and negative public opinion on the issue. While in the past such discourse has been primarily associated with parties in opposition (see Taggart, 1998) 
Public Opinion
Drawing largely on Eurobarometer data a number of studies have charted the volatility and increased negativity of public opinion post-Maastricht with regard to attitudes towards the EU (see Van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996; Gabel, 1998 Gabel, , 2000 . Peace and Neutrality Alliance, a pacifist organisation. Together these groups were able to provide a range of perspectives and critiques in public debates beyond that possible within the party political system (see Tonra, 2009 ).
Non-party groups
The shape and structure of national non-party movements is primarily structured by the national political opportunity structure (see Usherwood, 2006) . Such groups are more common where it is more difficult to access the party political system. When combined with the relatively high levels of public opposition in the country, it should not be surprising to find the fullest development of anti-EU groups is found in the UK. At its height, around 2000, there were approximately 30 groups in operation, ranging from think tanks (the European Foundation) to ginger groups (the Bruges Group), from single issue groups (Trade Unions Against the Single Currency) to grassroots organisations (the Democracy Movement) (Usherwood, 2002) . While this has fallen in recent years, with the diminishing political heat over the Euro and the Laeken process, there still remain a sizeable number of organisations, each typically working on a specific issue or aiming for a specific audience.
Also of increasing note is the development of trans-European networks of contact and exchange. Here the primary body is the European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements (TEAM), which links some 50 national groups in 18 states. TEAM works on the basis of shared information and practice, rather than attempting to regularize or introduce a common platform, an approach that has been the standard for trans-national interaction between groups. The proliferation of Eurosceptic websites and the emergence of a sceptic community in Brussels have also both contributed to increasing levels of contact at a bilateral level.
The Role of Referendums
Although referendums have historically been viewed as a means of bringing EU citizens closer to the EU, the stark reality is that they have served to further embed Euroscepticism in terms of the perception of EU Table 1 ) and in countries where voters have experienced membership (i.e. not including those in candidate countries prior to enlargement) only four of 11 votes have resulted in a 'yes' vote, two of these being re-runs of previously negative mandates in
Ireland (see Table 1 ). they read in the newspapers' there is no doubt that anti-EU media discourse has contributed to the increasingly embedded nature of Euroscepticism as a phenomon in certain EU member states (e.g. Boomgaarden et al., 2010) . This is particulary the case in countries like the UK where the other side of the argument is largely not transmitted to the public at large.
The Papers in this Special Issue
The special issue brings together a wide range of approaches and examples to illustrate the way in which Euroscepticism has become pervasive, embedded and persistent. Together, they seek to offer a fuller, more nuanced understanding of how this has come about, present the dimensions along which we might explore Euroscepticism and start to fully address the question of what consequences this has for the European Union and the future of European integration more generally.
Taggart and Szczerbiak build on their seminal works (2003, 2008) by revisiting and challenging earlier models of Euroscepticism, which pitched it primarily as a strategic device used by parties outside of government. By considering how Eurosceptics have been able to become parties of government in countries across the Union, they offer new insight into this maturation and mainstreaming of the phenomenon. In a similar vein, Guerra considers the shift in popular attitudes that has taken place in the past decade, specifically in new member states. While this is partly a factor of accession, Guerra's work points towards the increased importance of economic and utilitarian considerations in popular evaluations, a development that is likely to be strengthened further by the eurozone crisis. This latter point relates well with the findings of Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia, who conclude that while the global financial crisis of 2007-8 did not necessarily result in increased Euroscepticism at the level of public opinion, this is not necessarily the case for the subsequent eurozone crisis. They argue that the reason for this is that the former crisis was conceptualized by publics as having primarily national solutions, while the latter places member states more clearly within the EU framework, with the consequence that the Union is under pressure to be seen to be an efficient political and economic actor.
Indeed, Startin and Krouwel's work suggests that it might be necessary to look to an earlier critical juncture -the 2005 referendums in France and the Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty -to find the roots of the heightened profile and increased scope of Euroscepticism. The challenge to the permissive consensus that these votes represented, albeit partly conditioned by attitudes towards politics and politicians more generally, has opened up new discursive spaces for critical perspectives on the integration process.
As we have argued in this article, it is also important to move beyond the 'usual suspects' of political parties and public opinion when analysing Euroscepticism. Brack's contribution is a case in point with its examination of Eurosceptics within the European Parliament, an institution normally conceptualized as intrinsically pro-European. Brack's extensive fieldwork highlights the various ways in which Eurosceptics have used the platform of the EP to gain political leverage or profile, in both European and national arenas, as well as reinforcing their resource base through collective collaborative activity. This links in to FitzGibbon's work on civil society groups in three member states, each of which has seen groups become consequential political actors, leading or shaping public debate on the EU. This increased traction for Eurosceptic voices can only partly be understood by media environments, since it also speaks to the unwillingness of more pro-EU voices to fight a cause that struggles to find much resonance with citizens. In the case of countries outside the Union -as Skinner-Sundlisaeter discusses -these voices can often be dominant, particularly when considering cases where membership is a live political issue.
Skinner-Sundlisaeter suggests that in recognising that Euroscepticism is not purely a function of membership, it is important to bring that understanding into our modelling of the phenomenon.
In the final section of the special issue, we look beyond the present to consider the ramifications of an embedded and persistent Euroscepticism. By bringing in the arguments of Andrew Duff and his reflections on the need for active debate, it is hoped that this might stimulate a new space for debate that has thus far been lacking. While Duff makes clear his disagreement with the positions that are adopted, his willingness to engage in discussion, as we argue below, represents a step towards the identification of common ground. In narrower academic terms, Vasilopoulou's review of the debates within the literature points towards a new historiography of Euroscepticism and the emergence of a new phase of Eurosceptic activity. In so doing, it pulls together many of the debates discussed in the rest of the special issue and provides a springboard to future research agendas in this field.
The Consequences of Opposition
In this article, we have argued for an understanding of Euroscepticism as an increasingly embedded and persistent phenomenon within the integration process. Voices of dissent and opposition are to be found throughout national and European political systems and debates. This raises the key question of what consequence this might have and how it should be addressed, if at all.
Notwithstanding the embedding of Euroscepticism, opposition (certainly of the outright kind) remains marginal and heterodox behaviour, in the sense that it has not been able to achieve its objectives of stopping, reversing or fundamentally redirecting the development of what is now the European Union.
The breadth and depth of the elite consensus in Europe around the value of integration after the Second World War ensured that by the time significant voices of doubt and dissent were raised, there was a strong wellspring of support that could contain, and to a large extent ignore, those voices. The realignment of many elite groups to the realities of an increasingly intertwined and interdependent economic and political project, both at a material and an attitudinal level, has produced a strong position for further development of that project, or at least the status quo. We do not make any particular claims
here, but such realignment can be understood either as a consequence of a path-dependency, as in the historical institutionalist perspective (see Pierson, 1996) , or as a stage in a functionalist realignment of loyalties to the European level (see Haas, 1968) : in either case, it has been largely successful in keeping scepticism and opposition in a structurally weak position.
Despite this strong status quo, it is nevertheless important to recognise that the EU is moving into a different (and more difficult) phase of its existence (see Vasilopoulou, this volume) . No longer does the Union find itself in a period of major advances in terms of its development, in the way that it did in the 1950s and again in the 1990s. The protracted and painful unwinding of the Laeken process through the 2000s resulted in a Lisbon treaty that essentially reaffirmed the process to date, rather than a truly 'ground-up' reappraisal of the system. The difficulties in reaching even this modest consolidation suggest that there is no longer a widespread desire for major structural reform in the short and medium term. This trend is further reinforced by the severe impact of the global financial crisis since 2007, with all of its implications for national financial and economic retrenchment and for its impact on weaker economic growth, the latter historically having been associated with slowing in integration (see Dinan, 2005 for an historical perspective and Tsoukalis, 2011 for a recent view). The creation a fiscal compact outside the EU treaties highlighted the reluctance of some member states to use the EU itself as a vehicle for further integration, while the continuing eurozone crisis has become an important factor in the survival of governments from Greece, to the Netherlands, to Ireland. With this slowdown in integration in mind, from the sceptic camp's perspective, it becomes ever easier to find shortcomings in existing EU practice, knowing that major resolution is not likely to be forthcoming at any great speed. As the periodic 'relaunches' of integration have demonstrated, the system needs to be constantly reviewed and updated if it is not to be overtaken by events.
Coupled to this slowdown in integration is the historic stance that elites have taken towards sceptic views, namely one of ignoring them, or at least of giving that impression. This was most vividly seen in the 'reruns' of the referendums on Maastricht in Denmark and on Nice and Lisbon in Ireland, where there was a clear impression that people were being told to 'vote again and get it right' (Economist, 8 October 2009).
Likewise, the inability or unwillingness of the Convention on the Future of the EU to engage with the alternative draft presented by sceptic delegates (Usherwood, 2007) was emblematic of the difficulties that oppositional voices have been faced with when given such opportunities. Even in the environment where they have carved out the most noticable space (the European Parliament), the choice for sceptic MEPs is either to absent themselves completely or risk socialisation into the institution's practices and norms (Costa and Brack, 2009 ).
We would argue that notwithstanding the prepondence of communautaire views within the EU (and particularly its institutions), it is ultimately damaging to the Union to persist in ignoring sceptics. A central claim of the EU in the post-Maastricht era has been its transformation into a democratic and popular construction, where publics are listened to, engaged with and served: a task set out once again at Laeken. If the Union is to claim to be of relevance to publics, through the provision of effective and legitimate outputs, then perforce it must overtly engage with the full range of public opinion, a point explored at more length by Tambakaki (2011) . The longer that this situation is left to persist, especially when there is no grand projet to focus attention, the more likely it becomes that opposition will become ever more normalised and stronger: it acts as another part of the sceptics' critique of the Union that it does not even attempt to open a dialogue with them.
In the much longer term, this risks challenging the status quo that has protected the EU so far. . The currently open-ended nature of the crisis would seem to point towards further difficulties for both the Union and for national governments, be they member states that need support, or ones shouldering the responsibility of that support. As Euroscepticism becomes increasingly embedded at the various levels identified in this paper, it is ultimately in the European Union's interest to engage with sceptics, if it is ever to secure its overally legitmacy and future success. A failure to do so as Europe enters an uncertain economic phase could have serious consequences for the European project as a whole.
